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CASE COMMENTS
with the Workman rationale to conclude that a juvenile cannot be
waived to an adult court any time such waiver will subject the
juvenile to adult punishment. If this is so, the extent of the waiver
concept is impliedly limited to this extent.
Roy Franklin Layman
Domestic Relations-Constitutonality Of The
West Virginia Nonsupport Statute
Dewey Bragg was indicted for failure to support two children born
in 1950 and 1952. He was convicted on the theory that the children
were legitimate because they were born as a consequence of what
would have been a common-law marriage if such marriages were
recognized in West Virginia.' Bragg stipulated the existence of the
essential of a common law marriage but appealed on the ground
that the statute which declares that the issue of marriages null in
law are legitimate' is ambiguous and is not applicable to a nonsupport
action. Held, judgment affirmed. The provisions of the statute in
question are clear and unambiguous, and no limitations or qualifica-
tions may be read into it. State v. Bragg, 163 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va.
1968).
1 Common-law marriages contracted in West Virginia are null and of no
effect so far as the husband and wife are concerned. Cf. W. VA. CoDE ch.
48, art. 1, § 5 (Michie 1966); Kester v. Kester, 106 W. Va. 615, 618, 146
S.E. 625, 626 (1929); Beverlin v. Beverlin, 29 W. Va. 732, 736, 3 S.E.
36, 38 (1887). However, common-law marriages contracted in a state which
recognizes the validity of such marriages will be given recognition in West
Virginia. Meade v. Compensation Comm'r, 147 W. Va. 72, 82, 125 S.E.2d
771, 777 (1962); Jackson v. Compensation Comm'r, 106 W. Va. 374, 375,
145 S.E. 753, 754 (1928). There has been much controversy as to what
elements are requisite to a common-law marriage. In one West Virginia
case the elements were stated to be "lawful capacity to contract a marriage,
and matrimonial intent, bona fides, on the side of at least one of the parties."
Luther v. Luther, 119 W. Va. 619, 621, 195 S.E. 594, 595 (1938). In the
same case, the court stated the requirements to be "an understanding in the
present tense that the parties are husband and wife, and they must . . . in
good faith assume such relation . . . and believe in good faith that they
are husband and wife." Id. at 621-22, 195 S.E. 595.
2 W. VA. CODE ch. 42, art. 1, § 7 (Michie 1966), which reads, "The
issue of marriages deemed null in law, or dissolved by a court, shall
nevertheless be legitimate." This Code section will be referred to hereinafter
as the "legitimation" statute for brevity. It should be kept in mind that
legitimation may also take place by virtue of intermarriage of the parents
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The nonsupport statute3 under which the defendant was convicted
provides in part that "any parent who shall . . . desert or wilfully
neglect or refuse to provide for the support and maintenance of his
or her legitimate or illegitimate child or children, under the age of
eighteen years, is destitute and necessitous circumstances, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor ... ."' However, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has held that the nonsupport statute, insofar as
it pertains to illegitimate children, is in par! materia5 with the bastardy
statute, which provides that a proceeding under the bastardy statute
can not be instituted if the child is three years of age or older.'
The result of construing the nonsupport and bastardy statutes
together is that a prosecution for nonsupport of an illegitimate child
can not be maintained unless: 1) The child is under three years of
age; or (2) the paternity is admitted; or (3) the defendant admitted
the paternity before the child reached three years of age; or (4) the
paternity has been judicially determined in a bastardy proceeding
or nonsupport prosecution commenced within three years after the
birth of the child.' In the Bragg case, both of the children were
over the age of three years and none of the other criteria noted
above had been met. Therefore, action could be maintained only if
the children were found to be legitimate.
There has been no prior case in West Virginia construing the
"legitimation" statute in conjunction with the nonsupport statute.
Therefore, the defendant's contention that the "legitimation" statute
had the effect of legitimating the children of null marriages for the
purpose of descent only,8 and not for all purposes, presented a case
of first impression.
This issue was, however, before the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in the case of McClaugherty v. McClaugherty.9 In that case
the court held a father had a duty to support his child which had
been legitimated by virtue of a "legitimation" statute,"0 identical to
3 W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966).
41d.
5 State v. Richmond, 124 W. Va. 777, 780, 22 S.E.2d 537, 538 (1942);
State v. Hoult, 113 W. Va. 587, 588-89, 169 S.E. 241, 242 (1933); State
v. Reed, 107 W. Va. 563, 565, 149 S.E. 669, 670 (1929).
6 W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 7, § 1 (Michie 1966).7 Holmes v. Clegg, 131 W. Va. 449, 453, 48 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1948);
State v. Mills, 121 W. Va. 205, 207, 2 S.E.2d 278, 279 (1939); State v. Hoult,
113 W. Va. 587, 588-89, 169 S.E. 241, 242 (1933).
8 Brief for Appellant at 9, State v. Bragg, 163 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1968).
9 180 Va. 51, 21 S.E.2d 761 (1942).
'°VA. CODE ANN. § 64 1-7 (Repl. 1968).
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the one in West Virginia. In construing the "legitimation" statute
in a later case, the same court stated:
The language of our statute is clear, sweeping and direct.
There are no words of limitation or qualification. The issue
of marriages decreed null in law . . . are legitimated. They
are consequently endowed with all the rights of legitimate issue
for all purposes .... '.. (Emphasis added).
Legitimacy is a status, and to confer this status upon a child for
some purposes but not for others would indeed seem to reflect a
degree of legislative inconsistency not apparent from the wording of
the statute. In the Bragg case, the court did no more than hold
that no such incongruity was intended by the Legislature in the
absence of express language so indicating. While this decision is not
novel, it is important in that it clarifies the scope of the "legitimation"
statute in West Virginia.
A point of equal or possibly greater significance was raised by
the court's reference to the nonsupport statute being in par! materia
with the bastardy statute with respect to illegitimate children. While
this statement was dictum in the Bragg case because the children
were found to be legitimate, such an approach has been the basis
for holdings in prior decisions.2 As noted earlier, the effect of
construing the two statutes together is the establishment of a three
year statute of limitations for nonsupport actions with respect to
illegitimate children, while no such limitation exists if the child is
legitimate. This differentiation may pose a constitutional issue under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
States have wide latitude in making classifications,13 but they
may not draw a line which constitutes invidious discrimination
against a particular class. 4 The test is whether the statutory dis-
crimination is based on differences that are reasonably related to
the purpose of the statute."5 It is therefore necessary to analyze the
" Henderson v. Henderson, 187 Va. 121, 129, 46 S.E.2d 10, 14 (1948).
S2 State v. Richmond, 124 W. Va. 777, 780, 22 S.E.2d 537, 538 (1942);
State v. Mills, 121 W. Va. 205, 207, 2 S.E.2d 278, 279 (1939); State v.
Hoult, 113 W. Va. 587, 588-89, 169 S.E. 241, 242 (1933).
'"Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
14 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
'5Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Smith v. Cahoon, 283
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purpose of the bastardy and nonsupport statutes and the rationale
upon which the limitation in the former statute has been applied
to the latter.
The main purpose of the bastardy statute is to prevent the child
from becoming a charge upon the public. This end is accomplished
by compelling the father to bear the burden of its support.'" The
purpose of the nonsupport statute is "to prevent deserted and
abandoned persons from becoming a charge upon the public."' 7
Thus, although the former statute is criminal in form but civil in
substance and the latter is criminal, it is apparent that both were
enacted primarily for the benefit of the public. 8
The three year limitation in the bastardy statute was imposed
to prevent the danger of fraud that would exist if the question of
paternity of illegitimate children were left open for an indefinite
period. 9 Since the paternity of an illegitimate child may be deter-
mined in a non-support action,2° the limitation in the bastardy statute
was logically extended to the nonsupport statute.2'
If the sole purpose of these statutes is the protection of the public,
it is difficult to see how illegitimate children would be injured by the
three year limitation. In the absence of injury, they would have
no basic upon which to claim that the statutes in question constitute
an invidious discrimination.
It is arguable, however, that the bastardy and nonsupport statutes
establish a duty of support. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals took this view in Criukshank v. Duffield.2 In that case,
the court talked of the right of a wife and minor children to support
as arising from the husband's or father's duty to support them." On
16State v. Easley, 129 W. Va. 410, 415, 40 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1946).
7 Davis v. Prunty, 114 W. Va. 285, 286, 171 S.E. 644 (1933).
18 Holmes v. Clegg, 131 W. Va. 449, 453, 48 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1948).
19State v. Hoult 113 W. Va. 587, 589, 169 S.E. 241, 242 (1933).20State ex. rel. Wright v. Bennett, 90 W. Va. 477, 480, 111 S.E. 146,
147 (1922).
21 State v. Hoult, 113 W. Va. 587, 589, 169 S.E. 241, 242 (1933).
22 138 W. Va. 726, 77 S.E.2d 600 (1953).
23 d. at 733-34, 77 S.E.2d at 604, where the court stated:
"IT]he nonsupport statute not only provides for criminal prosecution of
a defendant who has violated the provisions thereof, but also provides
civil procedure for the enforcement of the right of a vife, or minor
children to support. The court, in its discretion, may enforce either the
criminal or civil liability, or both, as to a defendant convicted there-
under." (Emphasis added).
The civil procedure for enforcement is that the court may:
(1) direct that the husband or parent work on the public highways of this
[Vol. 71
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this theory, it can be seen that an illegitimate child for whom a
nonsupport action has not been commenced before the statutory
period has elapsed"4 can, through no fault of his own, be denied a
civil right solely because of his illegitimacy.
In Levy v. Louisiana" the United States Supreme Court held that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited
discrimination by the states between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren, with respect to the right of illegitimate children to recover
for the wrongful death of their mother. In a companion case, the
court reached the same decision in an action by a mother for the
wrongful death of her illegitimate child.'" The Supreme Court of
Washington had only a few weeks earlier reached the same decision
in a case in which an action was brought on behalf of a illegitimate
child for the wrongful death or her father.'
Subsequent to the Levy and Glona cases, the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that those decisions required that state statutes relating
to the obligations and rights of parents" be construed to afford
illegitimate children a right equal with that of legitimate children in
compelling support by their fathers.' 9 In this decision the highest
court of Missouri specifically overruled prior cases which had im-
posed no civil liability on the father for nonsupport of his illegitimate
child or children.3 o
In principle, the prior Missouri law denying minor illegitimate
children a civil remedy for nonsupport is difficult to differentiate
State or where he can obtain employment, and order such payments to be
made to the wife, guardian, custodian, or trustee of such minor child or
children as may be necessary for their maintenance under the circumstances;
or (2) if the husband or parent be regularly employed or obtain regular
employment, the court may order that such employment be continued, that
the husband or parent be confined in jail between hours of employment,
and that the sheriff collect the earnings, deduct reasonable expenses of the
husband or parent, and pay the balance to the wife, guardian, custodian or
trustee of such minor child or children. W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 8 § 1
(Michie 1966).
241Te rationale and purpose of the three-year statute of limitations may
be valid, but the question remains as to whether they are of sufficient im-
portance to override a constitutionally guaranteed right.
"5 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See 71 W. VA. L. REV. 52 (1968).
26 Glona v. American Guarantee and Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
27 Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash. Dec.2d 721, 440 P.2d 471 (1968).
"8Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 452.150, 452.160 (1952); Mo. REv. STAT. §
559.353 (Supp. 1968).
29 R- v. R , 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968).
"Heembrock v. Stevenson, 387 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1965); State v. White,
363 Mo. 83, 248 S.W.2d 841 (1952).
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from the present three year statute of limitations for nonsupport
actions with respect to minor illegitimate children in West Virginia.
It might therefore be reasonably argued in the future that the
nonsupport statute and bastardy statute, when read together, deny
certain illegitimate children equal protection of the laws.
David L. Core
Elections-The Use of Certificates of Nomination
Prior to the 1968 West Virginia primary election, the American
Independent Party circulated a certificate of nomination, as pre-
scribed by the West Virginia Code in an attempt to have the name
of its presidential candidate appear on the ballot in the general elec-
tion. Pursuant to the statutory provisions, the party filed these
certificates with the Secretary of State of West Virginia. The Daily
Gazette Company requested a list of these names in order to publish
them in its newspaper. Apparently, its purpose in so doing was to
discourage other voters from signing similar certificates circulated by
the party. Upon the refusal of the Secretary of State to comply with
this request, the Daily Gazette Company sought a writ of mandamus
from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Held, writ
refused. The Legislature has provided by statute that those voters
who sign a certificate of nomination shall not be allowed to vote
in the next primary election to be held where a candidate for the
same office is to be nominated. Even if the certificate is not a vote
in its usual sense, it is so analogous to voting as to be entitled to the
same consideration. The act of signing the certificate did not consti-
tute a change of party registration. Even if it did, the Daily Gazette
Company would still be denied the privilege of inspection because
the object of their inspection was for an improper purpose. State
ex rel. Daily Gazette Co. v. Bailey, 164 S.E.2d 414 (W. Va. 1968).
Normally, candidates for public office are nominated by primary
election or party convention. However, as an alternate method of
nomination, the certificate of nomination has been provided by statute
in West Virginia.' In the Daily Gazette case the certificate was used
to nominate a candidate for president. In subsequent litigation
involving the certificate the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
'W. VA. CODE ch. 3, art. 5, § 23 (Michie 1966).
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